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No. 20050658-CA

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
HARLAN ASHBY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

BOARD OF EDUCATION, SOUTH SANPETE SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant-Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
Board of Education, South Sanpete School District ("School District") submits this
brief in answer to the Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant Harlan Ashby.

Statement of Jurisdiction
This matter comes within the appellate jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (West 2004) because this is an appeal from a
judgment of a court of record over which this Court does not have original appellate
jurisdiction. On August 5,2005, the matter was transferred to this Court by the Utah
Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(j) (West 2004).
R.301.

Issue Presented
Ashby sued the School District for breach of contract. Midway through Ashby's
case in chief, he admitted facts which negated a necessary element of his breach of
contract claim. The School District moved for dismissal based on Ashby's admission.
After Ashby proffered no facts that would negate his admission, the district court
dismissed the case. Was the district court correct?

A

Standard of review
Whether dismissal was appropriate for failure to make a prima facie case is a

question of law reviewed for correctness. Grossen v. DeWitt 1999 UT App 167, ^|8, 982
P.2d 581. However, a trial court's factual findings based either on oral or documentary
evidence will not be set aside on appeal unless clearly erroneous. Id. at f 5.

B.

Preservation of issue
The School District raised this issue in an oral motion at the conclusion of Ashby's

direct examination. Tr. 119. The School District renewed its motion after crossexamination of Ashby was complete. Tr. 255. The district court addressed this issue
when it granted the School District's motion and dismissed Ashby's complaint.
Tr. 280-81; R. 294-98.

2

Determinative Constitutional
Provisions, Statutes and Rules
The following provision is attached as an Addendum to this Brief:
Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b)

3

Statement of the Case
1.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a final order in a breach of contract case granting a motion

to dismiss of the Sixth Judicial District Court, Sanpete County, State of Utah, the
Honorable David Mower presiding.

2.

Course of the Proceedings Below
Plaintiff Harlan Ashby brought this action against Defendant Board of Education,

South Sanpete School District (School District). R. 1-3. Ashby's complaint alleged that
the School District had breached its employment contract with him when it terminated his
employment in 1997. R. 1-2. The complaint specifically alleged that his employment
was terminated based on the false claim that he had misrepresented to the School District
that he had a master's degree when he only had a bachelor's degree. R. 1-2. The
complaint also made a claim for attorney's fees associated with the alleged breach of
contract. R. 2.
A two-day bench trial was held. R. 263-71. Ashby testified as the first witness.
Tr. 23.1 At the conclusion of Ashby's direct examination, the School District moved for
directed verdict.2 Tr. 119. Although Ashby had not finished his case in chief, the School
District based its motion on the argument that no matter what Ashby's remaining

Although the two-volume trial transcript is not bates-stamped, the record index
identifies the transcript as page 306 of the record. See final entry on the Judgment Roll
and Index attached to the inside front cover of volume one of the record.
2

Although the motion was in substance a motion to dismiss and not a directed
verdict, this statement of case refers to the motion by the same label as that used by the
district court and both parties.
4

witnesses said, no evidence could overcome Ashby's admission on direct examination
that he misrepresented to the School District that he had a master's degree. Tr. 119.
The court heard argument on the motion and took the motion under advisement.
Tr. 119-47.
The School District then cross-examined Ashby. Tr. 147-217. Ashby was briefly
excused from the witness stand to allow another witness to testify, but then returned and
completed his testimony on re-direct and re-cross examination. Tr. 219-224; 229-54.
After Ashby's testimony, the School District renewed its motion for directed verdict. Tr.
255. Both parties argued the motion for directed verdict. Tr.. 255-72.
The district court announced its tentative decision to grant the motion, agreeing
with the School District that no evidence could overcome Ashby's admission. Tr. 275.
Ashby then raised the issue of a proffer and the district court allowed him to proffer the
testimony of his other witnesses. Tr. 277-80; R. 294. After considering the proffer, the
district court stated that its initial ruling would stand because the proffered testimony was
not enough to overcome Ashby's admission. Tr. 280-81. Finding that Ashby was
properly discharged for misrepresenting his degree status to the School District, the
district court concluded that Ashby's breach of contract claim failed. R. 298; Tr. 280-81.
The court also dismissed the attorney's fees claim because it was a derivative of the
breach claim. R. 298; Tr.
A formal order of dismissal was entered June 30,2005. R. 294-98. Ashby filed
his notice of appeal on July 29,2005. R. 282-83.

5

3.

Disposition Below
By Judgment and Order on Directed Verdict entered June 30,2005, the district

court granted the School District's motion for directed verdict and dismissed Ashby's
complaint. R. 294-98.

Statement of Facts
The district court based its decision in part on oral and documentary evidence
presented at trial and in part on Ashby's proffer of evidence. R. 294.

Evidence presented at trial
Ashby was hired as a teacher by the School District in 1976. Tr. 26. At that time,
he had a bachelor's degree and approximately 90 additional credit hours. Tr. 25. Ashby
was placed in salary lane 3, a lane which was informally called the master's degree lane.
Tr. 35, 37.
In 1986, the School District added a fourth salary lane for teachers with a master's
degree, while lane 3 remained for teachers with a bachelor's degree plus 55 or more
additional credit hours. Tr. 42; Ex. 7. In December of 1986, in keeping with normal
practice, the School District sent Ashby two copies of his proposed contract for the 198687 school year. Tr. 179-80. The proposed contract placed Ashby in the newly created
fourth lane designated for teachers with a master's degree. Ex. 6. With the copies of the
contract, the School District superintendent also sent Ashby a memorandum, asking

6

Ashby to verify the salary lane and amount of the contract and, if correct, sign and return
one copy to the School District. Ex. 6;3 Tr. 179-81; 183.
Ashby signed the contract and returned it to the School District without correcting
the salary lane designation. Ex. 6. Ashby received and signed employment contracts
with the District for the next nine years, from the 1987-88 school term through the 199596 term, all with the improper lane designation. Ex. 10-19; Tr. 184-85. As a result,
Ashby was overpaid for nine years.4
Over the years, Ashby implied to other teachers that he had a master's degree by
telling them that he "had pursued a Master's Degree at the University of New Mexico."
Tr. 76. He would, however, tell close friends that he did not have a master's degree, but
was on Lane 4 for other reasons. Tr. 76. Sometime in 1995 or 1996, a School District
secretary, Sherry Neeley, requested that Ashby provide the transcripts of his master's
degree. Tr. 78. Ashby testified that he "panicked" and did not give Neeley an honest
answer by not correcting the perception that he had a master's degree. Tr. 78. Instead, he
stated that the information Neeley requested was in his personnel file. Tr. 79. Several
School District personnel asked Ashby to provide his master's degree transcripts for the
School District's files. Tr. 78,195-97. At one point, Ashby's principal, in an effort to get
Ashby's master's degree transcripts, even typed a letter for Ashby requesting his master's
degree transcripts from the University of New Mexico. Tr. 197. Despite these repeated

3

Because the trial exhibits, which are included in the Supplemental Record, are not
bates-stamped, this brief cites to them by their original trial exhibit number. Defendant's
exhibits are numbered 1-48 and 60-62, and Plaintiffs exhibits are numbered 49-59 and
63-67. A master exhibit list is included at the beginning of the Supplemental Record and
also appears at R. 268-71.
4

Ashby was not overpaid during the 1986-87 school year because lanes 3 and 4
were paid identical amounts for the step that Ashby was on. Ex. 7.
7

efforts to obtain Ashby's master's degree documentation, Ashby never stated that he did
not have a master's degree. Tr. 197.
Ashby finally admitted to the School District in June or July of 1997 that he did
not have a master's degree. Tr. 85. On August 13,1997, the School District suspended
Ashby without pay because of his false claim to have a master's degree and his continual
misrepresentation when he was asked to produce transcripts showing he had a master's
degree. Ex. 55. On August 28, 1997, the School District terminated Ashby for cause.
Ex. 56. One of the four allegations supporting his termination identified in his
termination notice was "[djishonesty or falsification of any information supplied to the
school district." Ex. 56.

Ashby's proffer
The superintendent had agreed to resolve the issue of Ashby's credentials by
decreasing his pay to the correct amount but then abandoned the agreement and fired him
instead. Tr. 278. Other employees found to be on the wrong pay track were not fired.
Tr. 278. The School District was looking for a way to terminate Ashby's employment
because of its displeasure with Ashby stemming from an audit two years before he was
terminated. Tr. 279,280. The School District used Ashby's dishonesty as a pretext for
firing him. Tr. 279. When Neeley asked Ashby for his credentials, Ashby never directly
told her that he had a master's degree, even if he may have been equivocal about it, but
instead directed her to the personnel file. Tr. 280. It was the practice of smaller school
districts to place teachers on a higher salary lane in order to compete with larger school
districts. Tr. 280. When Ashby was hired in 1976, the School District was not deceived
by Ashby about his academic credentials because Ashby truthfully stated that he only had
8

a bachelor's degree and Ashby was told not to tell other employees that he was on a
higher salary lane. Tr.279,280. 5

Summary of Argument

Ashby's admission of dishonesty warranted dismissal of his case because it
negated an essential element of his breach of contract claim, namely that he was fired
based on a false allegation that he lied about his credentials. Because this was not a jury
proceeding, the district court properly weighed Ashby's testimony, ultimately finding that
his admission defeated his breach of contract claim because it showed that the allegation
supporting his termination was true, that he had in fact lied about his credentials.
Because the evidence in Ashby's proffer was irrelevant to his limited claim that his
termination was based on a false allegation, the district court correctly concluded that
Ashby could not prevail breach of contract claim even if he were allowed to finish his
case in chief. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the district court's dismissal of this
case.
Although the dispositive motion here was labeled a motion for directed verdict, it
was in substance a motion to dismiss since this proceeding was a bench trial.
Accordingly, the authority pertaining to directed verdict cited by Ashby does not apply.
This Court should reject Ashby's invitation to weigh anew his trial testimony because the
5

Ashby embellishes his proffer on appeal. He states that the superintendent would
have testified that one of the real reasons for firing Ashby was that Ashby was sick. Aplt.
Brf. at 17. But the record reflects that Ashby did not mention sickness in his proffer of
the superintendent's testimony. Tr. 278-89.
9

findings the district court made with respect to the live testimony it heard are entitled to
deference on review. Furthermore, Ashby has not challenged the sufficiency of the
district court's findings or demonstrated that the findings are clearly erroneous; in fact, he
has argued that the clearly erroneous standard should not apply, based on inapposite
directed verdict cases.

Argument

Ashby's admission of dishonesty warranted dismissal because it
negated a necessary element of his breach of contract claim

The district court correctly determined that Ashby's admission of dishonesty
warranted dismissal because that admission negated an essential element of his breach of
contract claim. The complaint only alleged that Ashby's employment was terminated
based on a false allegation that he had misrepresented to the School District that he had a
master's degree when he only had a bachelor's degree. R. 1-2. By admitting that he had
in fact misrepresented his degree status, Ashby negated the essential claim that he was
terminated based on a false allegation. Because the allegation of dishonesty was not
false, by Ashby's own admission, the district court correctly concluded that no breach of
contract occurred.
Although the district court and both parties characterized the dispositive motion as
one for directed verdict, the motion was in substance a motion to dismiss under Utah R.
10

Civ. P. 41(b). Grossen v. DeWitt 1999 UT App 167, f7, 982 P.2d 581 (stating that u[i]n
the context of a bench trial... the directed verdict's procedural counterpart is a motion to
dismiss"). This court will review a motion thus mislabeled as a motion to dismiss. Id. at
Tf8. Accordingly, the argument portion of this brief will refer to the School District's
motion as a motion to dismiss. Much of the authority cited by Ashby deals with directed
verdict cases, where the trial court must not invade the jury's role as fact-finder. These
cases are of little help here where the judge acted as finder of fact.
The district court's findings that Ashby misrepresented his degree status are
entitled to a deferential standard on review. Although this Court reviews the legal
conclusions supporting the granting of a motion to dismiss for correctness, the underlying
findings of fact to which the law is applied are reviewed under the clearly erroneous
standard. Grossen. 1999 UT App 167 at %5. This more deferential standard is applied to
findings of fact that are based on either oral or documentary evidence presented to the
trial court. Id. Ashby's testimony and numerous documents were presented to the
district court in its capacity as fact-finder. Ashby testified that he panicked and failed to
give an honest answer when asked by the School District for his master's degree
credentials. Tr. 78. Ashby further testified that he implied over the years to other
teachers that he had a master's degree. Tr. 76. Ashby admitted signing ten successive
annual contracts without correcting the improper master's degree lane designation on
each contract. Tr. 184-85. The contracts themselves were admitted into evidence. Ex.
10-19; Tr. 184-85. And Ashby testified that several School District employees asked him
for his master's degree transcripts but he never stated that he did not have a master's
degree. Tr. 78,195-97. In addition to this evidence of Ashby's dishonesty, the district
court also heard the self-serving portions of Ashby's testimony cited in the opening brief.
11

Nevertheless, as fact-finder, the district court weighed Ashby's credibility and found that
Ashby was dishonest in representing his degree status to the School District. Because
Ashby does not properly challenge the sufficiency of this underlying finding, this Court
should assume that the record supports the finding and review only the accuracy of the
district court's conclusions of law. Grossen, 982 P.2d 581 at ^[10 (quotation marks and
citation omitted) (stating that "because appellants do not challenge the court's findings,
let alone demonstrate they are clearly erroneous, we assume that the record supports the
findings of the trial court").
Ashby now claims that he did not deceive the School District regarding his degree
status but this argument fails because it is an improper attempt to revisit the district
court's factual findings without marshaling the evidence. See Chen v. Stewart. 2004 UT
82,1f76, 100 P.3d 1177 (stating that in order to challenge a trial court's finding of fact, an
appellant "must first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and then
demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even when
viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below") (quotation marks and citation
omitted). This Court should reject Ashby's argument to the extent it asks this court to
improperly weigh portions of his testimony against other portions of his testimony.
Given the district court's finding that Ashby misrepresented his degree status, the
only legal question before this court, then, is whether the proffered6 evidence overcame

6

Although the district court announced a tentative ruling on the motion to dismiss
before plaintiff made a proffer of his remaining witnesses, the record is clear that the
court allowed plaintiff to make a proffer and then considered the proffer before making a
final ruling, even commenting on specific points raised in the proffer. Tr. 280-81. After
considering the proffer, the court announced that its tentative ruling would stand because
nothing in the proffer would have overcome Ashby's admission of dishonesty. Tr. 281.
12

Ashby's admission of dishonesty.7 This is a purely legal question since an appellate court
is in "as good a position to review the proffer as was the trial court, as no assessment of
witness credibility occurred below." Hambv v. Jacobson. 769 P.2d 273,278 (Utah 1989).
Even accepting as true everything in Ashby's proffer, nothing in the proffer is
relevant to Ashby's claim that his termination was based on the false allegation that he
misrepresented his credentials. Ashby's honesty with various individuals is irrelevant to
his signing ten contracts without correcting the improper lane designation. Regardless of
whether smaller school districts placed teachers on higher salary lanes to compete with
large school districts, Ashby proffered no testimony to establish that the School District
did in fact intentionally place Ashby on a higher track during the 1986-87 term or the
following nine school years for that reason. And even if Ashby would have been able to
prove that the School District used his dishonesty as a mere pretext for firing him, he
never explained to the trial court why such proof was relevant to his breach of contract
claim. Evidence of pretext was irrelevant to the only legal theory that Ashby pled or
clearly articulated below — that is, that the School District breached his employment
contract by terminating based on the false allegation that he misrepresented his
credentials. Nor has he provided any such explanation in his opening brief on this appeal.
Because Ashby's proffer thus had no relevance to his narrow claim that the School
District breached his employment contract by firing him based on a false allegation of
dishonesty, the district court correctly dismissed Ashby's complaint.

7

By Ashby's own admission, the allegation of dishonesty supporting his
termination was in fact true. Ashby could not have negated his admission of dishonesty
without impeaching his own testimony, which would also have then called into question
all of his self-serving testimony, throwing his case into chaos.
13

Additionally, although Rule 41(b) contains language suggesting that a motion to
dismiss would not normally be granted until after plaintiff has concluded his case in
chief, the obvious futility of Ashby's case weighs heavily in favor of the district court's
decision to preserve judicial economy by avoiding additional unnecessary time in trial.
Ashby concedes the general proposition that the language of Rule 41(b) does not
necessarily preclude a dismissal midway through a plaintiffs case, as long as there is
good reason. Further, the trend in federal authority supports the district court's decision
to dismiss Ashby's case when the futility of continuing the trial is apparent. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 41(b) was amended in 1991 to delete the phrase limiting a motion to dismiss to after a
plaintiff concluded his case in chief. Even before this amendment, several cases illustrate
the federal trend to allow dismissal midway through a plaintiffs case in situations similar
to the present case where the futility of continuing with the trial was apparent. A Fourth
Circuit case affirmed a trial court's dismissal of a case after opening statements when
plaintiffs opening statement revealed beyond question the absence of a valid claim and
the futility of a trial. Tuck v. Chesapeake & Ohio R.R. Co.. 251 F.2d 180 (4th Cir.
1958). The First Circuit affirmed a dismissal midway through a plaintiffs case in chief
when it became apparent that the only witness who could establish a material fact did not
have personal knowledge of that fact. P.P. Apparel Corp. v. Roadway Express, 736 F.2d
1 (1st Cir. 1984). Moreover, because Ashby could not have prevailed even if he had
been allowed to present his evidence as proffered, he suffered no prejudice from the
district court's decision to grant the motion to dismiss and any error was harmless. Price
v. Armour. 949 P.2d 1251,1255 (Utah 1997).

14

Conclusion

Ashby's admission of dishonesty warranted dismissal of his case because it
negated an essential element of his breach of contract claim, namely that he was fired
based on a false allegation that he misrepresented his credentials. Because this was not a
jury proceeding, the district court properly weighed Ashby's testimony, ultimately finding
that his admission defeated his breach of contract claim because it showed that the
allegation of Ashby's dishonesty was true. Because the evidence in Ashby's proffer was
irrelevant to his limited claim that he was fired based on a false allegation, the district
court correctly concluded that Ashby could not prevail breach of contract claim even if he
were allowed to finish his case in chief. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the district
court's dismissal of this case.

^fer<

Dated this & ~day of April, 2006.

XIFFORD PETERSEN
AssistantAttorney General
Attorney for Board of Education, South
Sanpete School District

15

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that I mailed TWO copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
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^"^ffay of April, 2006:

Randall C. Allen
BARNES & ALLEN, LLP
Depot Plaza
415 N. Main, Suite 303
Cedar City, UT 84720
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ADDENDUM 1

Rule 40

RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Note 8
witness to be present. Lancino v. Smith, 1909,
36 Utah 462, 105 P. 914. Pretrial Procedure <&=>
726
9. Involuntary dismissal for want of prosecution
Case was properly dismissed in 1987 for lack
of prosecution, where plaintiff filed complaint
in 1980, plaintiff amended his complaint twice
and tried to amend it a third time, plaintiff
moved for summary judgment three times, attempted to appeal denial and filed numerous
motions in an apparent attempt to circumvent
denial of summary judgment, plaintiff objected
to all three trial dates set, two of plaintiff's
three attorneys withdrew from the case because
plaintiff failed to pay them, plaintiff filed no
certificate of readiness for trial and took no depositions, and defense witnesses became unavailable. Rules Civ.Proc., Rules 40(b), 41(b).
Maxfield v. Rushton, 1989, 779 P.2d 237, certiorari denied 789 P.2d 33. Pretrial Procedure
<S=»587
Where medical malpractice action was filed
on October IS, 1972, trial date was set for
October 24, 1974, where on trial date plaintiffs
counsel moved for continuance after stating that
person he had hoped would testify was absent,
#nd where record showed that plaintiff or her
counsel had been dilatory in responding to efforts of defendant to obtain discovery and had
resisted defendant's attempts to resolve the issue by getting the case to trial, dismissal for
failure to prosecute was not an abuse of discre-

tion since plaintiff was not ready to proceed on
trial date, such failure was the result of inexcusable neglect, and no justification for continuance was shown. Rules of Civil Procedure,
rule* 40(b), 41(b). Maxfield v. Fishier, 1975,
538 P 2 d 1323. Pretrial Procedure<3=>597
10. Review
Trial courts have substantial discretion in deciding whether to grant continuances, and their
decision will not be overturned unless that discretion has been clearly abused. Rules Civ.
Proc, Rule 40(b). Brown v. Glover, 2000, 16
P.3d 540, 408 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 2000 UT 89,
on remand 2000 UT App 52, 2001 WL 298577.
Appeal And Error <§=> 966(1); Pretrial Procedure
<3=>7l3
Reviewing court should not reverse trial
court's continuance ruling without a showing
that trial court has abused its discretion. Rules
of Civil Procedure, rule 40(b). Bairas v. Johnson, 1962, 13 Utah 2d 269, 373 P.2d 375. Appeal And Error <&> 966(1)
Granting or refusing a continuance is discretionary, and will not be reviewed except in
cases of an abuse of discretion. Sharp v. Canaki* Gianulakis, 1924, 63 Utah 249, 225 P.
337. Appeal And Error <£=> 966(1)
The denial of a continuance, sought for absence of witnesses or a party, will not be disturbed, in the absence of an abuse of discretion.
Lancino v. Smith, 1909, 36 Utah 462, 105 P.
914. Appeal And Error <3=> 966(2)

R U L E 4 1 . DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
(a) Voluntary Dismissal; Effect Thereof*
(1) By Plaintiff. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e), of Rule 66(i), and of
any applicable statute, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without
order of court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the
adverse party of an answer or other response to the complaint permitted under
these rules. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal, the dismissal is
without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court
of the United States or of any state an action based on or including the same
claim.
(2) By Order of Court. Unless the plaintiff timely files a notice of dismissal
under paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an action may only be
dismissed at the request of the plaintiff on order of the court based either on:
(i) a stipulation of all of the parties who have appeared in the action; or
(ii) upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a
counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him
of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against
the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for
340

Rule 41

TRIALS

independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the
order, a dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice.
(b) Involuntary Dismissal; Effect Thereof. For failure of the plaintiff to
prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may
move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff,
in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation of
his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the
event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that
upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court
as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment against the
plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the
evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the
court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in its
order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and
any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party,
operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
(c) Dismissal of Counterclaim, Cross-Claim, or Third-Party Claim. The
provisions of this rule apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim,
or third-party claim. A voluntary dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to
Paragraph (1) of Subdivision (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive
pleadiiig is served or, if there is none, before the introduction of evidence at the
trial or hearing.
(d) Costs of Previously-Dismissed Action. If a plaintiff who has once dismissed an action in any court commences an action based upon or including
the same claim against the same defendant, the court may make such order for
the payment of costs of the action previously dismissed as it may deem proper
and may stay the proceedings in the action until the plaintiff has complied with
the order.
(e) Bond or Undertaking to Be Delivered to Adverse Party. Should a party
dismiss his complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, pursuant
to Subdivision (a)(l)(i) above, after a provisional remedy has been allowed such
party, the bond or undertaking filed in support of such provisional remedy must
thereupon be delivered by the court to the adverse party against whom such
provisional remedy w i s obtained.
[Amended effective November 1, 1997.]
Cross References
Dismissal of action for review of informal adjudicative proceedings, water and irrigation, see
§ 73-3-15.
Library References
Pretrial Procedure €>501 to 517, 551, 563,
307Ak581;
307Ak690;
307Ak693;
581, 690, 693.
388k384.
Trial <s>384
C J . S . Dismissal and Nonsuit §§ 2 to 34, 47 to
Westlaw Key Number Searches- 307Ak501 to
4 9 5 1 t o 6 2 > 6 6 t o 67f 6 9 t o 73, 79.
307Ak517;
307Ak551;
307Ak563;
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HARLAN ASHBY,
Plaintiff,

)

COMPLAINT

,
)

. n. « n - . ^ . ,
Case No. 01 OleOO-yp^

)

Judge \/_. L- fVcAff

v.
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION, SOUTH
SANPETE SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendants.
Plaintiff alleges:
1. In the year 1976, Harlan Ashby was hired as a teacher by the board of
education for the South Sanpete School District. He continued in that
employment through May 28,1997.
2. On August 13,1997, plaintiff was notified by letter that he was
suspended without pay beginning August 18,1997 for the specific reason that he
claimed to have a Masters Degree and continued to misrepresent that fact during
the years he was employed by the defendant.
3. The South Sanpete District Service Record states that the plaintiff had a
B.A. Degree in Archeology and none of the documents submitted by the plaintiff
state that he has a Masters Degree.

4. The plaintiff followed the appropriate administrative grievance
procedure and the school district determined that the grievance policy had been
met.
5. The charges against the plaintiff were falsely made and the plaintiffs
contract with the defendant was terminated based solely on those charges.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Contract)
Plaintiff incorporates all of the previous allegations into his first cause of action
and further alleges as follows:
6. The actions of the defendant constitute a breach of contract and plaintiff is
entitled to damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Attorney's fees)
Plaintiff incorporates all of the previous allegations into his second cause of
action and further alleges as follows:
7. The statements of the defendant made in support of termination were false
and untrue and are not supported by the documents and plaintiff takes the position
that the defendant acted in bad faith and that plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable
attorney's fee in an amount to be proven at trial.
WHEREFORE, it is the request of the plaintiff that he be entitled to damages
at an amount to be proven at trial and also be granted attorney's fees in an amount
to be proven at trial.

DATED this

/& ^

day of

"^fiush

,2001.

Karl H?"Mue1ler
Plaintiffs Address:
3965 Rome Way
Apple Valley, UT 84737

